How Minds Made Language (2): Foundational Cognitive Mechanisms
This second post of the series will cover the Cognitive Mechanisms that were precursors to language; specifically, this post will cover Theory of Mind and Conceptualisation.
Theory of Mind
Theory of Mind is likely a precursor for complex language and is the ability to recognise another individual’s intentions and beliefs (essentially, the ability to guess what another individual might be thinking).[i][ii] It's often described in 'levels of intentionality' (layers of thinking), e.g. 'I think[2] that you are thinking[2] about me' demonstrates 2 levels of intentionality – not all animal species have been proven to have this ability. Many primate species have been shown to possess a Theory of Mind, which is often demonstrated through tactical deception, like the case of the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin.
Austin liked to frighten Sherman by making loud noises in the outdoor enclosure. [ii] After which, he would come inside and pretend to be scared, and Sherman would become frightened, believing something to be outside. For Austin, this demonstrates three orders of intentionality: ‘I think [1] that Sherman will think [2] that I think [3] there is something outside’. Theory of Mind is used for intentional communication (e.g., teaching, persuasion, plan formation, etc.) and speech repairs (clarifying the meaning of something you have said when you think someone has misunderstood).[i]
Intentional communication involves purposely trying to change the state of knowledge in another individual; this requires an awareness that other individuals have different beliefs from our own, thus a Theory of Mind.[i] Intentional communication is important for many aspects of language, including the listed abilities above. Theory of Mind also enables language to be used for speech repairs, enabling us to infer that a miscommunication has occurred and rephrase the sentence.
Many of the language skills associated with Theory of Mind are often more challenging for individuals with Autism. Autism is a developmental disorder that makes it difficult to understand verbal and non-verbal intentional communication.[iii] This includes having difficulty with making jokes, tailoring communication to fit the interests of the listener, and understanding metaphorical or idiomatic language.[i] Therefore, Theory of Mind is an essential prerequisite for the development of typical communication.
Conceptualisation
Before we can use a word correctly, we need to have a concept of the referent we want to talk about; therefore, a concrete conceptual system is a precursor for language.[iv] For example, to use the word ‘dog’, you need to be able to distinguish it from other animals by holding a concept of what a dog is. Chimpanzees are much better at holding narrower conceptualisations than other species. The case of the chimpanzee Zee, who was able to sort objects such as buttons, nails, bolts, etc. into discrete categories based on colour, shape, and length. Therefore, chimpanzees have a finer-tuned conceptual system than other animals; although language is not needed for such conceptualisations, language enables further categorisations to occur. Our ancestors would have needed rich conceptualisations to label all the objects in their environment.
Moreover, ‘referential calls’ have been found in Vervet monkeys who have different alarm calls depending on the predator approaching.[v] A study found alarm calls specified for snakes, eagles, and leopards, which resulted in different behavioural responses. Arguably, these calls portray the stage between human symbolisation and non-symbolic communication systems of the animal kingdom.[vi] Despite some species demonstrating their ability to form narrow conceptualisations, no other species other than humans show a desire to label everything. Selection pressures likely caused language to co-opt this capacity for narrower conceptualisation and labelling. Words are essential for syntax to occur, which enables a clearer understanding of utterances (see Call Variants - series (3)).[iv]
Moreover, research has shown that linguistic labelling of concepts enables faster reaction times. The ‘Russian Blues’ study, conducted by Winawer et al. (2007), demonstrated that category labels facilitate faster colour discrimination.[vii] English and Russian speakers were asked to select which blue from two shades matched an example given. In English, there is only one word for blue (other terms are shades), whilst in Russian, there is a single term for light blue and another for dark. Russian speakers were found to discriminate between shades of blue faster than English speakers. Discriminating faster towards stimuli in our ancestors’ environment heralds obvious survival benefits, such as responding quicker to dangers or competitive resources.
[i] Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). Evolution of a theory of mind. In M. C. Corballis & S. E. G. Lea (Eds), The descent of mind: Psychological perspectives on hominid evolution (pp. 261–277). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192632593.003.0013
[ii] Dunbar, R. (2004). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language (2nd ed.). London, England: Faber and Faber.
[iii] National Autistic Society. (n.d.). What is autism? Retrieved December 22, 2022, from https://www.autism.org.uk/advice-and-guidance/what-is-autism?gclid=CjwKCAiAnZCdBhBmEiwA8nDQxbZNGF4ttWYOCsvKPckCACOZ5yaBl9YbqIHV6FV73_I3T2TkVBvTYxoCd5UQAvD_BwE
[iv] Burling, R. (2005). The talking ape: How language evolved. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[v] Carstairs-McCarthy, A. (1998). Synonymy avoidance, phonology and origin syntax. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert-Kennedy, C. Knight (Eds.), Approaches to the evolution of language: Social and Cognitive Bases (p. 288). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
[vi] Aitchison, J. (1998). On discontinuing the continuity-discontinuity debate. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert-Kennedy, C. Knight (Eds.), Approaches to the evolution of language: Social and Cognitive Bases (pp. 20-22). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
[vii] Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C., Wu, L., Wade, A. R., & Boroditsky, L. (2007). Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(19), 7780-7785. doi:10.1073/pnas.0701644104